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Vytautas Kavolis:
Civilizational Analysis as a
Social and Cultural Criticism
LEONIDAS DONSKIS
I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou.... All real
living is meeting.* (Martin Buber)

This study is an analytical attempt at mapping Vytautas
Kavolis's theoretical thought by tracing it within the framework
of his social and cultural criticism. It is not easy to provide such
a discursive map, since Kavolis's theoretical legacy stands as his
silent intellectual and moral autobiography. Therefore, it increases the responsibility of the author who comes to examine such an
intimate and deeply personal thing as another scholar's autobiography. Every statement and passage of Kavolis's thought, every
formulation or sequence of his working hypotheses — all of those
things are permeated by Kavolis's existential and social experiences. This is why the theoretical reconstruction of Kavolis's
social and cultural theories, if reduced to the examination of his
statements' formal logical structure or to the context and analytical organization of his thought, would enable us to employ merely a scientific jargon by pointing out those paradigms of sociological thought that have been accepted and then further elaborated by Kavolis.
Kavolis was very skeptical and critical about such a banal,
trivial and even "soulless" (as Kavolis would have said
himself) concept of the social sciences and the humanities and of
scholarship in general. Moreover, he was quite convinced that the
attitude toward scholarship and ideas, which refuses to take the
multi-faceted human experiences seriously, fails to enrich somehow either scholarship as such or the individuality of a scholar
himself/herself. Kavolis was extremely attentive to human diversity, spontaneity and unpredictability, let alone those empirically
invisible intellectual dramas and ideological passions that essentiallt stinulate one's need for constructing the critical and abalyti* Martin Buber, / and Thou (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 11.
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cal thought capable of articulating both oneself and the world.
He was very much interested in the actors of various societies
and historical epochs, traced back in his analytical studies and
interpretive essays, — not as in certain social or cultural types but
rather as in flesh-and-blood human beings whose moral stances,
modes of sensibility, and nuances of emotions come to uncover
the Great Chain of Being (to recall Arthur Lovejoy's term) and the
mystery of societal becoming as well. This is to say that Kavolis
seems to have been constantly trying to answer the question
which is most puzzling for every social analyst: What is the way
the organized societal life and colourful social theater spring from
such ordinary and mundane things as individual self-understanding, fellowship and friendship, mutual trust, and human interaction in general?
Instead of merely examining Kavolis's theoretical constructs,
I would like to make them talk to us — in order to conceive of
where they came f r o m and how they came into being. In doing so,
I will trace those implications of Kavolis's thought that are evidently evoking theoretical dialogue.
I hope that such a selection of Kavolis's theoretical legacy
might serve as a clue in understanding the origins and meaning of
his social and cultural criticism.
Truth and Value
Many concepts and definitions of the social and cultural criticism have been offered by the twentieth-century sociologists and
intellectual historians. Yet, I am not tempted to join the mainstream interpretation of the social and cultural criticism by simply
reducing it to the spread of the left-wing radical ideas in the social
sciences and the humanities; nor would I refer to it as a mere
social disconnectiveness of a scholar/intellectual from his/her
milieu; nor am I going to treat it as the allegedly obsessive revisionism. Rather, I will deal with social and cultural criticism as
the immanent and inescapable part, or even inner spring, of the
modern social sciences and of the humanities. Such a standpoint
is the only one that makes sense f r o m the perspective of the end
of the twentieth century.
Recall Louis Dumont's statement on the necessity of reconciling truth and value which have, since Kant, been radically sep-

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol38/iss38/5

2

Donskis: Vytautus Kavolis: Civilizational Analysis as a Social and Cultura
40

COMPARATIVE

CIVILIZATIONS

REVIEW

arated from and contrasted to each other in modern thought, i.e.,
within the framework of the modern symbolic configuration, 1 I
would like to point out that a sharp dividing line between truth
and value, in the context of the social sciences and the humanities, is artificial and even false. Moreover, the radical distinction
between truth and value simply does not work in tracing the phenomena of human consciousness; it refers to the ambitious epistemological program of modernity, rather than to a principal characteristic of the social sciences and humanities.
In the discursive universe of both the social analysis and
interpretation of culture, value reveals itself as something that
always lurks behind truth. Indeed, value is the very starting-point
in the quest for truth ; therefore, the former obviously underlies
the latter. Any study in social philosophy or sociology or intellectual history or anthropology or literary theory which has some
implications for social and/or cultural criticism arises from its
author's intellectual and moral autobiography, thus mapping
his/her existential and social experiences. Social analysts and/or
interpreters of culture usually arrive at the subjects of their studies through their value orientations and moral choices, rather than
through the specifically theoretical preconditions. This is why it
is so important to recall, following Max Weber, the distinction
between discovery of a topic and analysis of it. For Weber, the
identification of an object of research arose from a scientist's
value complex — while its analysis employed value-free methods. This is more than true regarding Vytautas Kavolis's moral
imagination and critical scholarship.
Vytautas Kavolis appears as one of those twentieth-century
intellectuals whose critical thought was in constant interplay with
the subjects chosen by them for analysis, and whose disciplinary
choices or methodological preferences were derived from, and
suggested by, their existential and social experiences. The ways of
looking at society and culture conceptualized and articulated by
Kavolis obviously reflect his passionate striving for active participation in, and even symbolic correction of, social reality.
This is borne out by Kavolis's numerous texts dealing with
Lithuanian history as well as with present culture, in which he
explained where, how, and why his country failed to embrace the
norms and values he so passionately advocated: the denial of any
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kind of collective oppressiveness and consensus
gentium-type
morality — as opposed to the principles of individual responsibility, reason and conscience; critical self-reflexivity of a society
and its culture — against any sort of self-centeredness and selfrighteousness; intellectual and moral sensibility towards the
Other — against the sense of fatal innocence and victimization;
morally committed individualism — as contrasted to both individual and collective forms of anomie. Kavolis's critical insights
into the nature of various cliches and even reactionary attitudes of
Lithuanian immigrants in the U.S. (from anti-Semitism, so widespread in twentieth-century Lithuania, to the lack of intellectual
and moral sensibility in general), deeply permeated and penetrated by his own experiences, shed new light on sociology itself as
a phenomenon bridging thought and action.
Vytautas Kavolis was born on September 8, 1930, in Kaunas,
Lithuania. In 1945, the fifteen year-old boy and his parents fled
to Germany and joined countless Lithuanian refugees known
under the generic term of DP, that is, Displaced Persons. Having
left their country occupied by the Soviet Union, the family spent
four years in various refugee camps. In Tuebingen and Hanau,
Germany, Kavolis finished his secondary education. Then the
family moved to the U.S. where Kavolis pursued his undergraduate studies at the University of Wisconsin (1950-52) and at the
University of Chicago (Summer, 1951). His graduate training
took place at Harvard University (M.A., 1956; Ph.D., 1960). His
doctoral dissertation w a s titled "Failures of Totalitarian
Socialization in East Germany: A Theoretically Oriented Case
Study." In order to imagine the context of Kavolis's academic
relations and personal acquaintances at Harvard, it suffices to
note that Pitirim A. Sorokin and Talcott Parsons were among his
professors.
The years of Kavolis's youth and maturity are equally marked
by his particular attachment to Lithuania; yet, as opposed to conservative Lithuanian immigrants in the U.S. who were nostalgic
about inter-war Lithuanian state and identity politics, Kavolis
moved the center of his intellectual and cultural concerns to the
future vision of Lithuania and its culture — the latter being
depicted, in his political and moral imagination, as West-oriented,
liberal, open, critical, self-reflexive, and equally sensible to itself
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and to the great themes or political/moral issues of the twentiethcentury world. Although Kavolis never applied for American citizenship, thus keeping his fidelity both to the idea of Lithuanian
statehood and to his own cultural identity, his political and moral
stance was far from plain patriotism. Kavolis's stance can only be
described in terms of critical and even severe examination of what
he passionately identified himself with — Lithuanian modernity,
its consciousness and culture. Kavolis always remained an
American academic by his professional vocation and theoretical
context, but a Lithuanian by virtue of his choice of being social
and cultural critic.
Kavolis taught sociology and comparative civilizations at
Tufts University (1958-59), the Defiance College (1960-64), and
Dickinson College (1964-1996). Since 1970 he was Professor of
Sociology at Dickinson College. On 1975, he was promoted to the
rank of Charles A. Dana Professor of Comparative Civilizations
and Professor of Sociology at Dickinson. Kavolis was Visiting
Professor of Sociology at the New School for Social Research
(1970-71). When his native Lithuania regained its independence
in 1990, he was active in numerous academic programs and
research projects at Lithuanian Universities: Kavolis was Visiting
Professor of Sociology and Cultural History at the University of
Vilnius, Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, and at the
University of Klaipeda (1992 and 1996). In 1993, Kavolis
received Lithuania's National Prize for Culture and Art for his
books on the modernity and contrasting models of self-understanding in Lithuanian culture — namely, Samoningumo
trajektorijos: lietuviu kulturos modernejimo aspektai [Trajectories of
Consciousness:
Aspects of the Modernization
of
Lithuanian
Culture] (Chicago: Algimanto Mackaus knygu leidimo fondas,
1986) and Epochu signaturos [Epochal Signatures] (Chicago:
Algimanto Mackaus knygu leidimo fondas, 1991).2
Yet, the discursive map of Kavolis's social and cultural criticism, likewise his intellectual portrait in the broader sense, would
be missing a main feature if we would pass by one more important aspect of his personality and of his activities. Kavolis seems
to have never been a disconnected academic professional solely
locked within a narrow world of academic references and connections. I am referring not only to Kavolis's intellectual and
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moral commitment to Lithuanian culture but also to his need for
the active participation in, and symbolic correction of, society
and culture that have been freely and consciously identified by
Kavolis as his own.
In other words, he needed not only to construct cultural theory but to symbolically construct the dynamic cultural practice as
well — such cultural practice which he could symbolically complement, correct or at least affect somehow through his explanatory framework, interpretive skill and incisiveness, and massive
analytical equipment. After all, Kavolis was always striving not
for the formation of his referent group sensu stricto but rather for
the formation of his Seelengemeinschaft,
that is, the community
of souls providing some intellectual and emotional intimacy of
human connection. As cultural theoretician, Kavolis always tried
to transcend the purely theoretical constructs — in order to enter
the dynamics and mundane reality of his own culture, and, then,
to experience and describe them from within. (This is why
Kavolis has come to define Lithuanian culture in terms of a certain cultural workshop, thus bridging the dimension of cultural
theory and that of cultural practice: in doing so, he has been tracing and critically e x a m i n i n g , in his o w n culture and its
political/linguistic practices, those forms and models of the universally valid human experience that have been suggested by his
comparative studies and theoretical reconstructions of society and
culture.)
Exactly the same might be said about Kavolis as sociologist:
he was very active in the construction of Lithuania's social and
cultural reality, thus transcending the limits of the social analysis
and trying to find out whether his imagined — for such a long
time — community is constituting itself as the society par excellence (i.e., as a common political and legal framework for the
self-activating public domain moved by both the political and
moral commitment and by human trust, rather than as a mere
arithmetic totality of atomized and victimized human individuals).
At this point, Kavolis appears to have been nearly the paradigmatic intellectual: his life and intellectual/moral stance may
well illustrate the notion of intellectuals as the agency of consciousness. Kavolis was the intellectual per definitionem, a man
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of the movement, for whom his group was of great importance
not only in experiencing a collective identity/group commitment
or cultivating a strong sense of "us" against "them" (although it
was also the case — without his vigorous journalism, persuasion,
political propagandizing, polemic passion, and even ruthless
irony targeted at the conservative part of the Lithuanian immigrant community in the U.S., Kavolis would be unthinkable), but
also in disseminating his social and cultural imaginations/implementing his ideas as well. 3
Every intellectual movement comes into existence through a
certain kind of self-legitimizing discourse or rather metadiscourse
from which there result such phenomena as: theoretical strategies;
methodological preferences and disciplinary choices; the proliferation of the social sciences and/or the humanities; keywords (such
as "the people," "freedom," "tolerance," "justice," "equality,"
"liberalism," "human rights," etc.); and the discourse — i.e., the
complex of the modes of speaking and thinking — of something
that is equally important for all members of a given group or
movement.
Such a metadiscourse, or background consciousness, containing the significations/signifying centers of social reality, on the
one hand, and the strategies or modes of speaking of them, on the
other, needs the Grand Text — it may well be a program document or manifesto or encyclopedia (as in case of the Encyclopedic
of the French Enlightenment movement) or journal (as in case of
the Ausra [The Dawn] and Varpas [The Bell] nationalist movements and their journals on the eve of the emergence of modern
Lithuania).
For Kavolis, the Santara-Sviesa
[The Concord-Light] union
(that is, the cultural union of Lithuanian immigrant liberals in the
U.S. headed by Kavolis) has virtually become both his intellectual/cultural movement and Seelengemein-schaft,
whereas the
vision of modern, liberal and West-oriented Lithuania, accompanied by the search for the new political and cultural discourse
capable of contextualizing and articulating Lithuanian liberalism,
has served as the above metadiscourse. Subsequently, the
Metmenys [Patterns] — i.e., the journal of the
Santara-Sviesa
movement edited by Kavolis from 1959 to 1996 — has become
his Grand Text. (Sadly and symbolically, Kavolis passed away on
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June 24, 1996, immediately after the conference of SantaraSviesa in Vilnius, Lithuania.)
It suffices to glance at the way Kavolis has been leading the
International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations
(1977-83) to prove that he has always been the program intellectual, a man of the movement par excellence. In the U.S. (or, to be
more precise, in the Anglo-American world), the International
Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations has become,
for Kavolis, his intellectual movement and
Seelengemeinschaft,
while his international metadiscourse might have been defined, in
his own terms, as the search for the "multicivilizational universe
of discourse" in the social sciences and the humanities. 4 Needless
to say that the Comparative Civilizations Review has served, for
Kavolis, as the Grand Text, even in the sense of a certain historical narrative.
The movement of North American civilizationists, initiated
by Pitirim A. Sorokin and then essentially influenced by
Benjamin Nelson and Kavolis, seems to have been perceived by
Kavolis as somewhat the collective alter ego of the SantaraSviesa movement (the latter has been named by Kavolis the
Institute for Multidisciplinary Studies not in vain; thus his intellectual commitment and moral one coincided). Exactly the same
may be said about the invisible kinship between the Metmenys
and the Comparative
Civilizations
Review. Indeed,
SantaraSviesa and the ISCSC, in Kavolis's life, were the communities of
affinity in terms of his life-long search for the ways of understanding the Other — in the idiom of self-and-civilization.
Kavolis's social and cultural criticism would be unthinkable
without those methodologies that have been elaborated and vitalized by him — civilizational analysis (along with Benjamin
Nelson, Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt and Louis Dumont) and the history of consciousness (among his predecessors and co-contributors, in theoretically constructing the latter, one could list Philippe
Aries, Michel Foucault, Louis Dumont and Hayden White). The
former provides a framework within which the key components
of every sociologically identifiable civilization — of its social
structure and symbolic organization — can be traced, in order to
uncover the flux of symbolic meaning; whereas the latter employs
in-depth structural exploration of the dynamics of the tendencies
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of consciousness and of the predominant ideas in a given society
or culture or historical epoch. 5 (They both bring us to a proper
understanding of what has been suppressed in one civilization but
more or less released and developed in other, let alone the models
of self-understanding and the ways of the perception of the
Otherness.)
Liberalism vs. Nationalism: Bridging Moral Cultures
One of the tensions experienced and reflected on by Kavolis
(particularly, in his Lithuanian essays) is that between selfappointed liberalism and the authentic liberal stance. In his essay,
"The Current Meaning of Being Progressive," Kavolis points out:
We feel spontaneously that we can never consider as liberal the one
who, though he appoints himself to be liberal, fights for restrictions of the
freedom of discussions, and thus contributes to such a societal atmosphere
in which one is afraid of expressing one's non-conformist opinion. We consider as liberal man the one who, notwithstanding his ideological views and
political coalition, fights for the diminution of restrictions in his milieu and
in the world in general. In this sense, John XXIII and Paul VI, by virtue of
having done their best to diminish restrictions within their institution, far
surpass those who, desperately trying to become the popes of the struggle
for freedom, succeed in turning to mere political propagandists of antiCommunism. 6

Kavolis also adds that liberalism can in turn have its own limitations (the editor of the Lietuviskasis liberalizmas
[Lithuanian
Liberalism], a unique book indeed in the context of twentiethcentury Lithuania, had severely criticized the weak points of liberalism, for he as nobody else was perfectly aware of its ups and
downs): "In some cases, liberalism may be unprogressive: when
children are given more freedom than they can take possession of;
when there is more care about criminals and their rights than
about the protection of their victims. However, even in those
cases when liberalism, in its effects, is unprogressive, it is
assessed in terms of the effort at diminishing restrictions, rather
than in terms of some abstract principle." 7
Another tension, which might be considered as the most
intense and, in the theoretical sense, the most dramatic in
Kavolis's works, is that between liberalism and nationalism. For
such a theoretician of responsible, i.e., morally committed, indi-
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vidualism as Kavolis, it was obvious that liberalism and nationalism might be not only compatible but even complementary phenomena — particularly, in bridging the individual identity and the
collective one. However, the elitist and aristocratic nationalism of
the first half of the nineteenth century, that is, nationalism of the
epoch of the springtime of the peoples which came into being
manifesting itself in A d a m Mickiewicz and Giuseppe Mazzini's
visions and their struggle for peoples' independence and freedom,
had eventually transformed itself into a mere exclusive nationalism. The latter, in the second half of the nineteenth century and,
particularly, in the first half of the twentieth century, was getting
more and more mass, doctrinal and ideological.
So it is not accidental that nationalism of the epoch of the
springtime of the peoples, which has come to respect and esteem
the Other's freedom in the same way it did with regard to its own
people, has been qualified by Kavolis as nothing other than a very
liberal nationalism (which was later replaced by the above-mentioned exclusive, doctrinal nationalism permeated by what
Kavolis called moral provincialism). In his article, "Moral
Cultures: Maps, Trajectories, Tensions," Kavolis put it thus:
T h e d a n g e r of nationalist [moral] culture lies in its moral
provincialism. Nationalism, as John Stuart Mill noted, m a k e s
people indifferent to the rights and interests of any part of
h u m a n k i n d , e x c e p t f o r that that is called the s a m e n a m e as they
are, and s p e a k s the s a m e l a n g u a g e they do. N o t a l w a y s , h o w e v er, has nationalist culture been provincial. In the first half of the
nineteenth century, E u r o p e w a s full of liberal nationalists w h o
believed that the struggle f o r the liberation of all peoples is a
c o m m o n cause: therefore, a patriot of one people m u s t help other
peoples as well. T h u s , later on, B a s a n a v i c i u s [one of the f o u n d ing f a t h e r s of Lithuanian nationalism, the e x p o n e n t of its liberal
version] participated in the m o v e m e n t of Bulgarian d e m o c r a t s ,
and G e o r g Julius J u s t u s S a u e r w e i n [the n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y
L i t h u a n i a n r o m a n t i c nationalist of Sorbian origin] wrote " W e
W e r e B o r n L i t h u a n i a n s " (and another version of the same s o n g
which w a s dedicated to the Sorbians). Yet, nationalism of the
second half of the nineteenth century — in part, b e c a u s e of the
impact of social D a r w i n i s m — m o v e d a w a y f r o m the notion of
universal brotherhood, enthusiastically shared by all nationalists,
and r e s h a p e d itself within quite a narrow f r a m e of the exclusive
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( " z o o l o g i c a l " ) d e f e n s e of people's interests by all means. T h i s is
to say that nationalism got " p r i m i t i v e . " (In m a n y non-Western
countries — f o r instance, in India, — the twentieth-century
nationalism has repeated this s e q u e n c e ; so we can ask if it might
be taken as as a natural part of the nationalist m o v e m e n t s ' evolution, that is, as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the transformation of nationalism into a m a s s p h e n o m e n o n ? ) E x c l u s i v e nationalism is incompatible with liberal culture which is, in principle, morally universalistic. (In the rationalist version of liberal morality: all are
equal in their rights ; in the r o m a n t i c version of liberal morali-

ty: all are equal in their pain which equally hurts everybody.)"
The question arises: Why and how did such a focus of theoretical and ideological tension appear in Kavolis's discursive universe? The reason seems to be quite simple: Kavolis was perfectly aware of the total absence and even impossibility of liberalism,
in its paradigmatic Anglo-Saxon version, in Lithuania. Obsessive
efforts to identify it in, or to impose it on, Lithuanian consciousness and culture would have led only to the coercive falsification
of Lithuania's history, politics and culture.
Some important prerequisites of political liberalism, which
may indeed be identified in Lithuania's history, date back to the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: the aristocratic legacy of liberalism and some manifestations of political and religious tolerance in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Lithuania that
have been explored by Kavolis through his painstaking study of
the Renaissance and Baroque Europe. The beginnings of political
and religious tolerance in Lithuania — that have manifested
themselves by Lithuania's historical virtue of once having been
multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural country — fascinated Kavolis; this is why he considered the multi-ethnic, multireligious and multi-cultural past of Lithuania its lost golden age.
Therefore, Kavolis had to search for what have been termed
by him the responding tendencies in consciousness and culture. In
other words, he had to find room, within the framework of
Lithuanian consciousness, for the theoretically identifiable beginnings of liberalism — in the form of the responding historical trajectories and tendencies of the thought and of intellectual/moral
stances. This is exactly how Kavolis came to construct the concept of cultural liberalism, the latter referring to the priority of
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individual reason and conscience — no matter explicit or implicit in a given society and culture — over collective oppressiveness
and consensus gentium-type
morality.
The concept of cultural liberalism served as a means to culturally assimilate liberalism to modern Lithuania's mainstream
value-and-idea system (though liberalism, in Lithuania, used to
be quite frequently misinterpreted and misrepresented as just
another term for agnosticism or left-wing political stances; this is
still the case). Moreover, the concept of cultural liberalism came
to enable Kavolis to hypostatize liberalism as such to the
autonomous moral culture or even paradigm of consciousness. It
sheds new light on the way Kavolis employs a comparison of the
nationalist, liberal and romantic moral cultures. The nationalist
moral culture, placed at the level of a broad comparative historical perspective, is assessed by him in the following way:
T h e moral culture of this type is d e e p l y rooted in history; o n e
m a y find its early, p r e m o d e r n f o r m s in Jewish and Chinese traditions. Yet, those traditions were " e t h n o c e n t r i c , " i.e., perceiving
the entire virtue of the world as represented solely by their own
c o m m u n i t i e s . Current nationalism is said to have b e c o m e , in the
brightest m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of its maturity, " p o l y c e n t r i c , " i.e., striving f o r the equal and n o r m a l participation of its o w n nation in
the concert of all nations — c o n s u l t i n g their equally valuable
cultures and learning f r o m them. [...] T h e symbolic a r e n a of
nationalist culture is the ritual of the repetition of history, be it the
never-ending c a m p a i g n to r e c o n q u e r A l s a c e or G a n d h i ' s d e m o n strations of non-violent resistance. T h e addresses of nationalists
are j u s t the s a m e — the ever-lasting repetition of the same. 9

Being aware of how problematic is the search for the origins
— or at least manifestations — of liberalism in Central and East
European political history, Kavolis was trying to identify and analyze both the particular liberal stances and the element of liberality itself in the history of Lithuania's national rebirth (or, to be
more precise, of Lithuanian modernity, however failing in the
course of history). He had qualified the ideas and stances of the
Varpas [The Bell] and Ausra [The Dawn] nationalist movements
(along with those of their leaders Vincas Kudirka, Jonas
Basanavicius and Jonas Sliupas) as liberal, thus drawing a sharp
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dividing line between a liberal nationalism and a conservative
one. In doing so, Kavolis was theoretically and intellectually
bridging the nationalist and liberal moral cultures in virtue of
employing the perspective of the history of consciousness (otherwise, he would inevitably have failed to accomplish such a task,
for neither political theory nor political practice may provide a
sufficient basis for bridging those, one would think, mutually
exclusive things). At the same time, Kavolis was consistently trying to overcome the abyss between his own frame of reference,
conceptual framework and analytical/interpretive language, on
the one hand, and the mainstream Lithuanian consciousness and
culture, on the other.
In his comparative studies, Kavolis impressively contextualized cultural liberalism tracing it back to: Socrates's ethical intellectualism and, particularly, his idea of the priority of the individual reason and conscience over the collective decisions; some elements of Christian theology stressing the crucial importance of
the principle of the free will; Chinese neo-Confucianists' intellectual and moral stances; the frame of mind of the Heian epoch
Japanese aristocratic culture; the assertion of Hinduism and of the
Grand Duke of medieval Lithuania Gediminas's that all the ways
— regardless of how distinct they can be — lead to that same
God; and even the early Islam's principle of ijtihad, according to
which, one is entitled to use one's individual reason in interpreting the religious laws of Islam. 10 Kavolis seems to have always
been convinced that cultural liberalism, both in the West and in
non-Western civilizations, disseminates as the universal element
of human experience, although explicit and developed political
liberalism has been unambiguously taken by him as the solely
Western phenomenon of political consciousness. (Therefore, the
possible implication of this thought would be as follows: cultural
liberalism has its chance even in those societies and cultures
where political liberalism, historically thinking, has never had
any possibility of coming into being.)
The theoretically accurate, flexible and differentiating attitude toward nationalism (without which it would be impossible to
make any clear distinction between the Herderian-Renanian paradigm of nationalism, that is, liberal nationalism par excellence,
and the Action Fran^aise-type reactionary, radical and integral
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nationalism, not to mention the grasp of how the modern Central
and East European nations came into political existence) has
assisted Kavolis in embracing its grandeur and misery:
F o r liberals, the principal criterion to evaluate nationalism is
that of f r e e self-determination. T h e nation's rights to political and
cultural i n d e p e n d e n c e are protected insofar as the nation expresses its m e m b e r s ' self-determination to perceive t h e m s e l v e s the
way the nation represents. Yet, the liberals will a l w a y s raise their
voices in d e f e n s e of the individuals' rights and, a b o v e all, of the
right of self-determination about h o w to be a h u m a n in cases: if
the authorities of a given nation h a p p e n to d e t e r m i n e w h o does
b e l o n g to the nation, and w h o d o e s not; what should be f o u n d in
its m e m b e r s ' souls, and what can never be f o u n d ; or if they happen to deny the n o r m a l h u m a n rights of those w h o d o not belong
to that nation/those w h o d o not w a n t to b e l o n g to it. T h e collective m a y be respected insofar as it respects both the individuals
and the variety of their reason, c o n s c i e n c e and life-styles. In liberal d e m o c r a c y , only pluralist and ethnically unlimited nationalism is acceptable, w h e r e a s assimilationist and ethnicity-cleansing nationalism can never be a c c e p t e d . "

However, in bridging Lithuanian consciousness, as one of the
manifestations and agencies of the nationalist moral culture, and
the liberal moral culture, Kavolis kept his fidelity to the principle
of the critical self-reflection. As noted, Kavolis was perfectly
aware of the limitations of liberalism itself. This is why he was
striving for its integration in the multidimensional, complementary and coherent framework for a more proper interpretation of
the world. Both as one of the modern moral cultures and as one
of the predominant political ideologies of the modern world, liberalism is merely one of many ways to reflect on social reality
and human individual, one of many possibilities to describe
human consciousness in terms of existential and social experiences. In fact, being the derivative of Western rationalism and
individualism (inescapable from the British empiricist tradition
and common sense political philosophy as well), liberalism
missed many points of human experience that are deeply grounded in other faculties of human sensibility: the sense of history, collective identity, group commitment, joint devotion, religious and
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mystical experiences, and the like. Needless to say, those points,
throughout history, have been dealt with and articulated by other
moral cultures.
One of the paradoxes of liberal social philosophy and of liberal moral culture would be that that the classic British version of
liberalism, i.e., Millian liberalism of the nineteenth century,
remained surprisingly insensitive to the process of the formation
of the new national entities, and particularly to the cultural and
moral dimensions of this process. One wonders why and how it
could be the case, since nothing else but liberalism came to construct the concept of political nation thus lifting it to the rank of
the key ideas of modernity. The concept of political nation came
into being through French social philosophers of the
Enlightenment (at this point, nearly all the philosophes are worth
of mentioning here; yet, such theoreticians of equality and tolerance as Montesquieu, Condorcet, Helvetius and Bayle should be
mentioned first) and Anglo-American political philosophy of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
This is the reason why the disconnectiveness of the nineteenth-century liberalism (with regard to those dramas and passions that captivated a half of Europe) is really surprising. Most
probably because of this kind of its disconnectiveness, Kavolis, in
his works, mentions — from time to time — the inability of liberalism to conceive of a number of the structures of sentiments
and the nuances of emotions that are of decisive importance for
individuals' moral stances and for social connection as well.
Notwithstanding its limitations, liberalism was considered by
Kavolis as the only moral culture, the very essence of which lies
in advocating the principles of individual reason and individual
conscience. Nowhere else but in the liberal moral culture (and its
historical prototypes that anticipated and shaped cultural liberalism), has there emerged the free human being capable of determining him/herself by his/her own reason and individual conscience, and critically questioning him/herself and his/her society/culture .
It should never be forgotten, however, that the nationalist
moral culture has also made its substantial contribution to the
social and cultural criticism, for nothing but the nationalist type
of moralization has promoted the connected and committed
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social/cultural criticism. Through the notions of the universal
brotherhood/sisterhood and moral egalitarianism immanent to,
and deeply inherent in, nationalism, the nationalist moral culture
has promoted the historically unprecedented social intimacy
between a particular individual and his/her imagined 12 or real
community. (This moment of importance will be traced below.)
By stating the insufficiency and limitations of the liberal
moral culture in embracing the variety of the forms of modern
consciousness and culture, Kavolis notes:
Liberal
culture itself insufficiently e m b r a c e s the totality of
h u m a n e s s e n c e and of h u m a n relation with his milieu. T h e nineteenth-century liberal culture t o o k seriously neither nature, nor
radical evil, nor the distinctiveness of national cultures, nor the
s u b c o n s c i o u s sphere of h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e s and its d e m a n d s . It
failed s o m e h o w to identify the e m o t i o n a l reciprocities and emergent, though never verbalized, h u m a n solidarities
—

Seelengemeinschaften."
At the same time, Kavolis has never had any doubts about the
liberal moral culture's ability to provide a serious alternative to
those negative tendencies of other moral cultures that have been
termed by him moral provincialism, ecclesiastic imperialism,
ascetic revolutionism, and irresponsible determinism; 1 4 neither
has Kavolis had any doubts that "liberal culture underlines one of
the basic human elements which is suppressed in other moral cultures: his ability to rationally judge everything by his own reason
and conscience, while recognizing others' right to arrive at conclusions different from his, and his duty to perfect the ability of
his judgment all the time: the problems we encounter in the
course of human and civilizational development tend to become
more and more complex." 1 5
Although Kavolis has always subscribed to the liberal standpoint, the liberal moral culture, in his theoretical vision, can only
acquire its real theoretical and moral value by entering the space
of dialogue or even polylogue with other — both classic and modern — moral cultures. The same interpretive principle of polylogue, translated from his moral stance into the explanatory
framework, has been applied by Kavolis to the comparative study
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of civilizations: there are no (and there cannot in principle be)
self-sufficient civilizations, since some of them come to release
and develop something that is inevitably suppressed, or at least
neglected, in others. Thus, the comparative study of civilizations
coincides with social and cultural criticism while tracing the models of self-understanding and of the perception of the Other.
This is precisely the theoretical context and moral focus
where the idea of the bridging of moral cultures (that is, the idea
of one's free participation in several moral cultures, which
implies the critical questioning and symbolic correction of one's
own culture from a comparative perspective) comes from.
Therefore, the scholar's participation in, and critical examination
of, several moral cultures (i.e., one's capacity to reflect on one's
own participation in several models of cultural logic, thus theoretically attaching oneself to, and contextualizing in, their interplay) becomes part of the scholar's moral biography. In so doing,
he places him/herself in the imaginary gallery of other individuals and in the symbolic archives of their moral biographies as
well.
Kavolis has extended the following hypothetic thesis on the
contrasting logics of moral cultures:
M o r a l cultures h a v e d i f f e r e n t logics that tend to contradict each
other. T h e thinking of those w h o participate, in at once, in several moral cultures (i.e., the thinking of those w h o think f r o m within of the c o n t e m p o r a r y man's existential situation) should rest on
their clear a w a r e n e s s of the inexorable conflicts b e t w e e n these
cultures and of the w a y s of dealing with these conflicts: W h a t
kind of things are to be b r i d g e d ? W h a t kind of a b y s s e s (or of
qualitative stumblings) are to be accepted and penetrated by their
lives and d e s t i n y ? O n e of the tensions, which m a n i f e s t s itself in
the c o n t e m p o r a r y liberal culture of the West, is as f o l l o w s : Is the
rational public life possible w h e n the intimate culture is romantically anarchist? S h o u l d one search f o r the c o m m o n g r o u n d f o r
these separated spheres of m o d e r n existence? If so, should one

return to some traditional concept of transcendence or should
one move forward towards the totality of human experiences as a
common link between what have been separated by modernity?
[Italics mine] 1 6
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Kavolis seems to have penetrated the very core of modernity
and its challenge by offering his inclusive theoretical alternative.
H o w to react to the challenge of modernity? H o w to accept it?
(This problematical focus sheds new light on postmodernism as
one of the possible responses to the fundamental theoretical alternative and existential dilemma formulated by Kavolis. He considered postmodernism to be the possible way to reconcile those
things that have been taken by modernity as incompatible in principle, rather than as a mere theoretical trend in fashion.) How to
reconcile and bridge what have been ruthlessly separated by
modernity: truth and value; rationality and emotional intimacy;
expertise and sensitivity; hierarchy and equality/individualism;
tradition and innovation; the classic canon and the released creative experiment; metaphysics and phenomenalistic science; a
particular individual and community; a particular community and
universal humanity?
One of the possible ways would be to suggest a return to
metaphysics and religion (that is, to what has been called by
Kavolis the traditional concept of transcendence) — the phenomena that have been, from the point of view of the split between
truth and value, neutralized, relativized and, consequently, placed
by modernity on the margin of consciousness and existence.
Another way (suggested by the sequence and logic of Kavolis's
thought and by his ambitious epistemic program for both the
social sciences and the humanities) would be rather an attempt at
analytically embracing and, by attaching the dimensions of value
and meaning, encompassing the totality of human experiences —
through the comparative study of civilizations. The latter implies
the analysis of the flux of symbolic meaning and of the change
of the structures of consciousness over time in Western and nonWestern civilizations — by capitalizing on the civilization analysis and the history of consciousness.
Modernity with a human face — this term, coined by
Kavolis, refers to the necessity of sensibility in social analysis and
interpretation of culture. Both coincide with social and cultural
criticism, since they are constantly accompanied by the tension
between the is and the ought to be. On the other side, truth and
value can never be located in a single culture or civilization. Truth
and value disseminate insofar as a comparison of the comple-
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mentary, though distinct, models of self-understanding is
employed.
An exponent of the modern sociological disciplines, civilization theoretician and sociologist of culture (it was Kavolis who
had even invented such, one would think, a hardly possible sociological discipline as the sociology of fine arts), Kavolis, however, seems to have never been tempted to exaggerate the significance either of Western scholarship or of Western intellectual culture in general. He has been interested not only in Western civilization's "conquest and exodus" (Kavolis used this term introduced by Eric Voegelin in his philosophy of history,17 although
Kavolis did not subscribe to Voegelin's point of view), that is, not
only in its political and cultural accomplishments, crises and culde-sacs, but in the possibility to theoretically contextualize
Western civilization itself by conceiving it within, in Kavolis's
own terms, the idiom of self-and-civilization, too.
The question is: Whether it is possible to adequately conceive
of Western civilization only within the framework of the modern
configuration of values and ideas? This issue might be referred to
as the very point of departure for Kavolis's notion of the comparative study of civilizations. For him, the comparative study of civilizations was oriented to provide an interpretive and conceptual
framework for self-understanding within the idiom of self-andcivilization. The implication is that comparative studies are interlaced with one's own intellectual and moral biography, — that
was the way Kavolis arrived at both the civilization analysis and
the history of consciousness. His enthusiasm about, and dedication to, comparative studies had nothing to do with the doctrine of
political correctness. Kavolis's civilizationist commitment is
much more likely to have been directly related to his intellectual
conscience. The latter, as the conditio sine qua non for transcivilizational empathy and theoretical sensibility in general, seems to
have become one of the principal categories not only for Kavolis
but for Benjamin Nelson as well.18
However, for Kavolis, modernity was too complex a phenomenon to be reduced to some simplistic schemes or overgeneralizations: he took modernity in an all-encompassing variety of
its forms and national variants instead, on the one hand, and thus
entailed the analysis of contradictions within modernity, on the
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other. Tracing some antimodernist intellectual and moral stances
or antimodernist tendencies of consciousness of a given society
(e.g., e x a m i n i n g a series of the failed m o d e r n i z a t i o n s in
Central/East European countries), Kavolis perceived them as but
an inescapable and unavoidable part of modernization itself.
For instance, one of the most interesting implications of
Kavolis's concept of modernization is his statement that nothing
but modernity comes to reveal/invent the tradition, for, according
to him, we simply do not have another interpretive framework to
articulate it except for that within which historical consciousness
and historical narratives disseminate. In fact, historical consciousness (i.e., backward- and forward-looking consciousness
critically questioning or even rejecting the present) is just another term for modernity. Therefore, the stances of traditionalists
and even of fundamentalists of various kinds — no matter
whether they are aware of that or not — are merely a certain
inversion of modernity. Other conceptual or interpretive frameworks, within which it would be possible to reflect on traditions
or traditional cultures or premodern civilizations, simply do not
exist.
This statement might be best exemplified by referring to
Kavolis's analytical study, "Civilizational Paradigms in Current
Sociology: Dumont vs. Eisenstadt." Having noted that Dumont is
evidently criticizing modernity from a premodern perspective,
Kavolis points out: "What is problematic about this type of critical theory is that Dumont judges modernity from premodern
premises (which, he argues, have in crucial respects been validated by the shortcomings of modern experience). D u m o n t justifies
choosing this perspective by arguing that the premodern is, in the
experience of humanity, the typical case, the modern the exceptional. [...] But it might also be thought that the premodern should
be approached through the particular version of the modern (taking for granted that modernity emerges in culturally diverse
forms) in which the directions of development of the former are
revealed." 19
Kavolis's attempts at reconciling and bridging those moral
cultures and cultural logics that have been separated by modernity, as noted, have always been present behind his scholarly projects and academic activities. The following passage, dealing with
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the tension between the rational public life and the romantically
anarchist intimate culture in the Santara-Sviesa
movement,
shows how deeply permeated by the challenge of modernity
Kavolis's individual existence and public life were: "Perhaps,
throughout the history of Lithuanian cultural movements, this tension has nowhere else been so dramatic as in the spiritual universe
of the Santara-Sviesa where both of these stances — the rational
public life and the romantically anarchist intimate culture — are
equally intensively emphasized, equally spontaneously accepted." 20
The theoretical construct, therefore, had to be embodied in
cultural practice and mundane reality. On the other side, even the
theory itself turns out to be quite frequently inspired by a mere
human friendship. For Kavolis, Santara-Sviesa was not merely a
movement; nor was it a mere model of Lithuania as his imagined
community. As noted, it was rather a community of souls which
almost perfectly embodied the principle of unity in diversity.
After all, Santara-Sviesa
exemplified the Romantic notion of
friendship as a joint devotion. It is not difficult to notice that
Kavolis considered human trust and friendship to be the clue to
the puzzle of human connection. Most probably, hence Kavolis's
theoretical interest in the history of human friendship and socialization.
The Pathologies of Ambiguity
and the Ambivalence of Criticism
Kavolis's works on both "the ambiguous man" and "the
pathologies of ambiguity" throw new light on his notion of social
and cultural criticism. The distinction between "unambiguous
man" and "ambiguous man" refers to cultural psychology — one
more boundary discipline balancing between the social sciences
and the humanities, which has been elaborated by Kavolis. (Such
disciplines as cultural psychology or literary sociology or sociology of fine arts resulted from Kavolis's conscious attempts at
crossing the boundaries of disciplines, on the one hand, and bridging the social sciences and the humanities, on the other.) Hence
Kavolis's studies in comparative social pathologies examining the
origins of destructiveness and tracing the models of evil.
Once more, let me recall the fact that Kavolis was an untypi-
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cal sociologist. The frame of sociology was too narrow for him.
Not in vain, one of Kavolis's main theoretical ambitions was to
provide a multi- and interdisciplinary framework for civilization
analysis within which there would be possible to bridge social
philosophy, sociology, psychology, anthropology (particularly,
symbolic anthropology based on the interpretive framework of
Clifford Geertz's works — it was one of Kavolis's methodological and disciplinary preferences), intellectual history, cultural history, historical semantics, semiotics, and literary theory.
He was by no means globalist — the globalization theory
seems to have been outside Kavolis's scholarly concerns. He was
by no means dreaming about certain "great syntheses"; nor was
he longing for the revival of Grand Theory — Kavolis has never
had any doubts about the priority given to the relationship
between theoretical sophistication and empirical evidence, rather
than to the purely speculative thought. Therefore, psychohistorical anthroposociology — such a term was first coined by Nelson
and Kavolis for civilization analysis — came to refer not to a certain pigeon-holing methodology but, on the contrary, to joint disciplinary dedication to the analysis of such problems that are
hardly possible, for particular disciplines, to embrace or at least to
handle somehow. It should never be forgotten that Kavolis was
always stressing short-term, ad hoc disciplinary alliances that are
very easy to dismantle immediately upon one's arrival at some
conclusion summing up complex research.
Small wonder, then, that it was vital for Kavolis to demonstrate, in the perspective of cultural psychology, how the structural shifts of symbolic meanings and/or the symptoms of societies,
historical epochs, cultures, and civilizations in crisis manifest
themselves through a particular human individual and his/her
behavior or stance. One should admit that a society or culture in
crisis inevitably reveals itself through individual consciousness/human individual in crisis. One of such manifestations of
culture in crisis is what has been termed by Kavolis the ambiguous man.
In his analytical study, "The Pathologies of Ambiguity,"
Kavolis notes that a number of humans quite frequently reveal,
for themselves, their psychic ambiguity, although they become
absolutely clear and unambiguous in forming or at least influenc-
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ing other humans' behavior and stances. In Kavolis's opinion, the
ambiguous man is especially longing for the intense experiences:
this kind of the striving for intensity, which is psychoanalytically
identifiable and exploitable, jeopardizes not only the personality
of the ambiguous man but the entire modern consciousness and
culture as well. According to Kavolis,
W h e r e there prevails the striving f o r intensity, there p r e d o m i n a t e s
— quite o f t e n — the authoritarian style in both thinking and
d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , even w h e n the c o n s c i o u s c o n t e n t s of the
thought is libertarian: let's take, f o r e x a m p l e , M a r c u s e or the
Living Theater. T h e intensity seekers quite naturally tend to think
in polarities contrasting " t r u t h " to "error," or " v i r t u e " to " m e a n ness," instead of searching f o r s o m e m i s s i n g links and nuances.
T h o s e n u a n c e s represent nothing other but the p s y c h i c ambiguity in their character w h i c h they consider u n b e a r a b l e and try to
repress with arbitrary, though "real," m o m e n t s of intensity. T h i s
is w h y they, even in d e m a n d i n g the f r e e d o m of choice, expect
others to c h o o s e their way to be f r e e or even their w a y to conceive of f r e e d o m . T h e d o g m a t i c d e m a n d s to the world spring
f r o m the inner ambiguity of personality. O n e can be preserved by
the
vigorous
terms
from
one's
inner
dissolvement.
( P s y c h o a n a l y s t s used to identify this m e c h a n i s m in the earlier,
m o r e or less romantic, Russian revolutionaries.) D o g m a t i s m is
the m e c h a n i c a l stabilization of the a m b i g u o u s m a n , rather than
the organic one springing f r o m the depth of his personality. (Yet,
this kind of protective armor, d e e p inside the a m b i g u o u s m a n ,
sooner or later c o m e s to crack d o w n and destroy either the
a m b i g u o u s m a n himself or others.) 2 '

One of the possible implications of Kavolis's thought would
be that that the ambiguous man, being incapable of analytically
grasping and critically questioning himself, eventually comes to
misrepresent social reality itself projecting on it those painful elements of his personality and experience that are too hard for him
either to understand or to eliminate from himself. (It would be
some kind of dogmatism which springs from the cognitive dissonance.) Therefore, if "the dogmatic demands to the world spring
from the inner ambiguity of personality," dogmatism itself is
merely an illusion of both the clear standpoint and transparent
thought.
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One's striving for intensity, in one's milieu, actually betrays
one's ability to critically analyze neither oneself nor human reality as it is — before its enchantment with some kind of ideological magic, ideocratic formulas, carnal and psychic experiments,
and the like. The dogmatic/ambiguous man is incapable of critically analyzing at all: he is only capable either of creating some
gloomy prophecies or of symbolically excommunicating those
who are considered to be a threat to the body social and its nearly mystical coherence (when the quest for enemies comes to
replace the critical analysis, his troubled imagination easily provides a group-target).
Kavolis offers an even more strict formulation: "The demand
of intensity may be easier satisfied by the action — or by the 'carnal thinking,' i.e., by the substitution of the thought for the
motions and sounds, — than by the intellectual (especially, disciplined), self-critical analysis; it may be easier satisfied by the
destruction of what is present (or by some bizarre experiments)
than by the creation of something new." 22 Then we can observe a
sudden transition of Kavolis's thought to the new theme which
was most probably of great personal importance for him: "It may
throw new light on the ambiguous men's tendency toward cultural pessimism, that is, the extreme criticism of a given culture and
its institutions. Such a criticism was widespread in Germany,
from the end of the nineteenth century to the Weimar period, and
it prepared a good soil for the Nazi 'Utopia' [...]. This case denies
the standpoint that criticism is always a remedy of society." 23
Kavolis's statement implies that e x t r e m e , radical and
detached social and cultural criticism (or, to use one of Michael
Walzer's key terms, the disconnected criticism 2 4 ) is flourishing in
the countries which have a relatively weak tradition of the politically committed, i.e., connected, social and cultural criticism. So
Kavolis might have employed the following working hypothesis:
the disconnected criticism (I would define it as the ad extra criticism) and cultural pessimism come into existence where it was
virtually impossible to disseminate — either because of a historically short, weak and fragile tradition of liberal democracy (as
in nearly the entire Central and Eastern Europe, except for the
Czech lands) or because of the historically unprecedented oppressiveness of the state power structure and the deeply grounded gap
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between culture and politics (as in Russia) — either for Utopian
imagination (in its classical shape) or for the connected critical
thought, i.e., the ad intra criticism.
The question arises: Whether and how social criticism is possible where there is neither the public domain nor the elaborate
public political discourse, and where criticism can only manifest
itself either through the antistructural m o v e m e n t s (as, for
instance, the skomoroch — Russian jesters in semi-Byzantine
medieval Russia or, say, the yurodivye in Russia of Ivan the
Horrible or of Boris Godunov) or through exaggerated cultural
pessimism, overgeneralizations and gloomy prophecies? (After
all, what does remain from the society as such if the public
domain and public political discourse happen to be eliminated?
Where can connected criticism arise from if this happens to be the
case?) It would be difficult to imagine a West European or North
American critical thinker depicting his/her country in the way the
great Russian cultural pessimists Piotr Chaadaev and Vladimir
Pechorin did. Only having realized the difference between the latter, on the one hand, and, for example, Ralph Waldo Emerson or
William Morris or Samuel Butler, on the other, we can properly
understand the crucial difference between the ad extra criticism
and the ad intra one.
One of the most profound of Kavolis's insights into the moral
origins of the nationalist critique of nationalism, that is, the social
and cultural criticism within the framework of the nationalist
moral culture, reveals a hardly identifiable basis for the politically and morally committed criticism in the twentieth century:
T h e liberal and r o m a n t i c moral cultures, a f t e r all, are rooted
respectively in the individual's rational (ascetic) and e m o t i o n a l
(mystical) depth, w h e r e a s the nationalist m o r a l culture rests on
c o m m u n i t y , i.e., a historically concrete, " n a t u r a l " c o m m u n i t y ,
w h i c h is being, on the voluntary and mystical basis, m a i n t a i n e d
or r e v i v e d by the c o m m i t t e d individual. T h e individual f i n d s
himself as h a v i n g r e c e i v e d a significant part of his moral substance f r o m his c o m m u n i t y , and is prepared to hand o v e r this substance, after having it refracted through his o w n experience, to
the next generation of the c o m m u n i t y m e m b e r s . But inasmuch as

his community's experience becomes his personal substance, part
of his identity, he severely judges this community and its history
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rejecting those things that are perceived by him as the deformation of his moral character. At the same time, he judges himself
asking whether his contribution to community coincides with
what it needs the most [italics mine].25
And then Kavolis ironically sums it up: "[...] W h a t it actually
needs, not necessarily coincides, in the nationalist view, with
what its people concretely want. The nationalist follows and conforms to a theory which provides the ready-made answer what
the people does want, not to the polls of population." 26 Therefore,
if the social/cultural critic, instead of participating in several
moral cultures, limits and reduces him/herself to a single nationalist moral culture, it betrays either the symptoms of ambiguity in
his/her consciousness and moral stance, accompanied by the
striving for intensity and political power, or the shabby individual
identity, accompanied by the desperate need for some kind of
symbolic compensation/dissolution in the mystical collective
body.
This is to say that the ambiguous man can never become the
connected critic. Such a human ambiguity may easily transform
itself into the ambivalence of criticism, which disseminates in the
severe critiques of those social phenomena (certain models of
social order or of culture, modes of human interaction and selfexpression, institutional practices, networks of social organization, etc.) that are considered by the critic to be alien and hostile
to his/her imagined community and its lost golden age. (Needless
to say that this is nothing else but the classic odi et amo attitude
one can direct either to oneself or to others.) In brief, the connected critic is unthinkable without what has been called by
Kavolis the clear structure of identity and personality.
Connected social and cultural criticism might best be defined
in the following way: it implies and rests on one's ability to experience the dynamics and dissemination
of one's society and culture as one's own drama, while treating social analysis as the correction of the field of one's own intellectual possibilities
and
moral choices. In other words, criticism means one's ability to
absorb the most symptomatic tendencies of social and cultural
change taking place in one's society and culture, and, then, to
return them — permeated by one's individual experience and the-
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oretical articulation — to one's community or society, in the
form of critical warning or of intellectual and moral trial.
The most proper context of Kavolis, as social and cultural
critic, refers to the company of "the nationalist critics of nationalist politics" (following the way in which Michael Walzer has
described Martin Buber). 2 7 This company is primarily represented by such non-conformist and politically committed critics as
Albert Einstein and Martin Buber — both dedicated Zionists,
though mavericks and dissenters in the Zionist movement, who
frequently criticized the Zionist movement leaders and their policies. As Walzer has incisively noticed, Julien Benda — the very
embodiment of disconnected criticism — would undoubtedly
have thought of such a position as impossible. 28 However, Benda
would most probably have been in turn labeled by Kavolis as an
ambiguous critic.
The question may arise: Does it make any sense to compare
a Lithuanian immigrant, interactionist sociologist and civilizationist with an Austrian-Jewish philosopher and theologist, the
founding father of the dialogue-based personalism, and, after all,
a committed Zionist and one of the most severe critics of Zionist
politics? I believe that such a comparison makes sense in many
respects. First, like Buber, who might best be defined as the
philosopher of return, Kavolis is the withdrawal-and-return sociologist (to slightly modify Arnold J. Toynbee's term). Both have
severely and consistently criticized what has been perceived by
them as the object of their devotion — their imagined communities that have eventually come into being as the nation-states
(both have essentially contributed to the nation-building process).
One would think that it is they of whom Lewis Coser has said:
"We are likely to be especially critical of the things we love." 29
Second, one more common feature of Kavolis and Buber has
to be pointed out — their particular intellectual sensibility which
may well be described in terms of theoretical and moral empathy.
It suffices to recall Kavolis stressing the importance of the ethics
of compassion, inherent in the romantic moral culture (as in the
romantic version of liberal morality: all are equal in their pain
which equally hurts everybody), and of the perception of the
Other. Walzer characterizes Buber's empathy by referring not
only to him but to the Talmud as well: '"It is only common sense,'
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as the Talmud says. 'Who knows that your blood is redder [than
his]? Perhaps his blood is redder' [...]. The same argument holds
with regard to the group: 'There is no scale of values for the function of peoples. One cannot be ranked above another' [...]." 3 ° Both
Buber and Kavolis, by virtue of having been the dialogue theoreticians par excellence, have raised their voices against instrumental and manipulative exchanges. Last but not least — they can
be analyzed as nearly the paradigmatic cases of liberal nationalism which always has its universalistic moral implications.
Kavolis's attitude to the intellectual, emphasizing the ascetic
self-discipline, self-denying love to work, and self-dedication,
evidently relates to the universalist origins of the liberal moral
stance. As Walzer puts it: "The crucial moral principle of the true
intellectual has the form of a self-denying ordinance. It was perfectly expressed many centuries ago by a Jewish sage giving
advice to other sages and would-be sages: 'Love work, do not
domineer over others, and never seek the intimacy of public officials' [...]."" This attitude obviously penetrates Kavolis's closing
remark on cultural liberal: "For a cultural liberal, it suffices to do
his work, to be immune to various distractions, and to resist moral
corruptions in himself. "32
It is very important to note that Kavolis, in spite of his fidelity and commitment to his native Lithuania, has never identified
completely himself with anything thus preserving his critical distance and individual independence from the establishments, political authorities, and bureaucracies. His stance might best be
summed up by referring, once more, to Walzer. Walzer has written the following words on Albert Einstein: "A man of passion
and detachment, he found his own equilibrium in a balance of the
two." 33 These words perfectly fit for Vytautas Kavolis as well.
Postscript
My main task, in this study, was to substantiate the working
hypothesis that Kavolis's great theoretical ambition to bridge the
social sciences and the humanities, their disciplines and
approaches, methods and perspectives, etc., was nothing else but
the continuation and derivative of his great ethical intention to
bridge the distinct moral cultures and models of self-understanding. This is exactly how value comes to manifest itself, in the uni-
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verse of the social and cultural critic's discourse, constantly
underlying what we take as truth, i.e., the adequatio rei et intellects dimension.
Therefore, Kavolis's multi- and interdisciplinary studies of
society and culture can be depicted as the very top of an iceberg
beneath which there lurks his conscious and even highly prescriptive participation in the distinct, though complementary,
realms of human existence (in Kavolis's own terms, in the distinct
symbolic logics and frames of meaning). Having defined civilizations — the largest comprehensive and sociologically identifiable
sociocultural entities — as symbolic designs emanating values
and meanings for human self-understanding and self-fulfillment
over time, Kavolis has come to treat the comparative study of civilizations not only as the specifically theoretical project but as a
phenomenon of transcivilizational sensibility and conscience as
well. Such a concept of civilization, which deals with it as consisting of social structure and symbolic organization, came from
Nelson's works (Kavolis has acknowledged that Nelson has been
a major contributor to this perspective — a perspective which
seems to prevail in current comparative studies). 34
Like all great theoreticians who are — by virtue of being
provocative and challenging — far ahead of plain empiricism and
obedient school-theorizing, Kavolis had some vulnerable points
in his analytical studies and interpretive essays. (As noted,
Kavolis applied interactionist sociology to the comparative study
of civilizations.) Having capitalized on some humanist interpretive techniques and cultural (particularly, literary) documents, he
crossed the boundaries of disciplines and expanded the horizon of
the social analysis, let alone his numerous challenges to the things
that have been taken for granted before. Yet, he took empirical
data and information about societies and cultures solely from the
scholarly journals and books. This is why his direct contact with
social reality sometimes seems to be somewhat problematic.
(Although Kavolis's rare theoretical and cross-cultural sophistication has essentially contributed to the incisiveness of his social
analyses.) Moreover, Kavolis took empirical data on non-Western
civilizations solely from the secondary sources, i.e., the monographs and studies written by other authors, where the facts and
data were already refracted through a certain explanatory frame-
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work or analytical scheme. Most probably, this is one of the
unavoidable problems of every methodologist and conceptualist.
Kavolis's last theoretical concerns revolved around the problem of human trust, which was lifted by him to the rank of a f u n damental sociological issue. How does human capacity for association and communication, originating from such, one would
think, unimportant things as various voluntary societies and
clubs, eventually turn into the mighty social capital from which
there results the modern — pluralist and civil — society? W h y
humans, in well-organized social life, are no longer clinging
together or striving for, in Kavolis's terms, the "strong" relations
and extremely intense friendships (that would be perceived as the
only hope for the meaning of their lives)? W h y is this still the case
in Central and East European countries where intense and strong
human friendship is frequently accompanied by the absolute mistrust regarding the state and its institutions, i.e., the forms of
organized societal life? How does society — which should never
be confused with the arithmetic totality of human beings — originate in general? These questions reflect the basic sociological
concerns of Kavolis in his last Lithuanian contributions. They
show him as having returned to the primary questions of the
social analyst and critic.
The critic is always in the universe of the primary questions
and in the situation of the permanent beginning.
University of Klaipeda,
Lithuania,
and Dickinson College, Pennsylvania,
USA
NOTES
1. See Louis Dumont, "On Value," The Proceedings of the British
Academy, 66 (1980), pp. 207-41.
2. Among Kavolis's other books which became his major contribution both
to Lithuanian intellectual culture and to international scholarship, the following
should be mentioned: (1) Lietuviskasis liberalizmas [Lithuanian Liberalism ],
Editor (Chicago: Santara-Sviesa, 1959); (2) Zmogaus geneze:
psichologine
Vinco Kudirkos studija [The Genesis of Man: A Psychological Study of Vincas
Kudirka] (Chicago: Chicagos Lietuviu literaturos draugija, 1963); (3) Artistic
Expression: A Sociological Analysis (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1968), translated into Swedish and Spanish, Chapter 5 translated into German;
(4) Nuzemintuju generacija: egzilio pasaulejautos eskizai [The Generation of
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the Uprooted: Sketches of the Psychology of Exile] (Chicago: Santara-Sviesa,
1968); (5) Comparative Perspectives on Social Problems, Editor (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1969); (6) History on Art's Side: Social Dynamics in Artistic
Efflorescences (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972); (7) Designs of
Selfhood, Editor (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1984);
(8) Civilizations East and West: A Memorial Volume for Benjamin Nelson, CoEditor, with E.V. Walter, Edmund Leites, and Marie Coleman Nelson (Atlantic
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1985); (9) Moralizing Cultures (Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 1993); (10) Moterys ir vyrai lietuviu kulturoje [Women and Men in Lithuanian Culture] (Vilnius: Lictuvos kulturos institutas, 1993); (11) Zmogus istorijoje [The Human Being in History] (Vilnius: Vaga,
1994); (12) Civilization Analysis as a Sociology of Culture (Lewiston, N.Y.: The
Edwin Mellen Press, 1995); (13) Kulturine psichologija [Cultural Psychology]
(Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 1995); (14) Kulturos dirbtuve [The Workshop of
Culture] (Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 1996); (15) Civitizaciju analize [Civilization
Analysis] (Vilnius: Baltos lankos, 1998; forthcoming). Therefore, Kavolis is the
author of 17 books written and/or (co)edited by him. At the same time, he is the
author of around 150 scholarly articles and of 20 book reviews.
3. Exactly those features as characteristic of the modern intellectual are
referred to by Robert Darnton. In his brilliant article on the eighteenth-century
French Enlightenment movement led by the philosophes, Darnton considers the
latter to have been the very prototype of what we call the intellectuals. See
Robert Darnton, "George Washington's False Teeth," The New York Review of
Books, XLIV, 5 (March 27, 1997), pp. 34-8.
4. For more on this issue, see Vytautas Kavolis, "Structure and Energy:
Toward a Civilization-Analytic Perspective," Comparative Civilizations Review,
1 (1979), pp. 21-41; particularly, p. 38.
5. For more on the history of consciousness and civilization analysis, see
Vytautas Kavolis, "History of Consciousness and Civilization Analysis,"
Comparative Civilizations Review, 17 (1987), pp. 1-19; Vytautas Kavolis,
Civilization Analysis as a Sociology of Culture (Lewiston, New York: The
Edwin Mellen Press, 1995).
6. Vytautas Kavolis, "Siandienine pazangumo reiksme" ["The Current
Meaning of Being Progressive"], in Virginijus Gasiliunas, ed., Metmenu laisvieji
svarstymai: 1959-1989 [Free Debates of the Metmenys: 1959-1989] (Vilnius:
Lietuvos rasytoju sajungos leidykla [The Lithuanian Writers Union Press],
1993), p. 58.
7. Idem.
8. Vytautas Kavolis, "Moralines kulturos: zemelapiai, trajektorijos, itampos" ["Moral Cultures: Maps, Trajectories, Tensions"], in Metmenu laisvieji
svarstymai, op. cit.. pp. 184-85.
9. Ibid., pp. 183-84.
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10. See Vytautas Kavolis, "Liberalaus galvojimo erdveje" ["In the Space
of the Liberal Thinking"], Metmenys [Patterns], 63 (1992), p. 39.
11. Ibid., p. 38.
12. The term "imagined political community," coined by Benedict
Anderson for the definition of the nation, seems to express the very essence of
both the nationalist moral culture and of nationalist historical and cultural imaginations. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso,
1991), pp. 5-7.
13. Kavolis, "Moralines kulturos...," op. cit., p. 191.
14. Later on, Kavolis, in his monograph, Moralizing Cultures, comes to
name the irresponsible determinism "a modern amoral culture" and "the culture
of determinism." This concept, as well as the terms signifying it, had obviously
assisted Kavolis in providing some incisive insights into the phenomena of the
conspiracy theory, victimization, and technocratic consciousness. See Vytautas
Kavolis, Moralizing Cultures (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America,
1993), pp. 48-9.
15. Kavolis, "Moralines kulturos...," op. cit., pp. 191-92.
16. Ibid., pp. 190-91.
17. See Eric Voegelin, Order and History, Volume 4 (Baton Rouge,
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), pp. 212-38.
18. For more on this issue, see Vytautas Kavolis, "Nelson's Legacy of
Comparative Studies," in E.V. Walter, Vytautas Kavolis, Edmund Leites, and
Marie Coleman Nelson, eds., Civilizations East and West: A Memorial Volume
for Benjamin Nelson (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1985),
pp. 17-24.
19. See the revised version of this study in Kavolis, Civilization Analysis
as a Sociology of Culture, op. cit., p. 33.
20. Kavolis, "Moralines kulturos..." op. cit., p. 191.
21. Vytautas Kavolis, "Neaiskumo patologijos" ["The Pathologies of
Ambiguity"], in Metmenu laisvieji svarstymai, op. cit., p. 126.
22. Idem.
23. Idem. In stating this, Kavolis refers to Fritz Stern, The Politics of
Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1963).
24. See Michael Walzer, The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and
Political Commitment in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1988),
pp. 3-28.
25. Kavolis, "Moralines kulturos...," op. cit., p. 183.
26. Idem.
27. See Walzer, The Company of Critics, op. cit., p. 66.
28. See ibid., pp. 37-8; p. 66.
29. Quoted from ibid., p. 43.
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30. Ibid., p. 67.
31. Ibid., pp. 43-4.
32. Kavolis, "Liberalaus galvojimo erdveje," op. cit., p. 45.
33. Walzer, The Company of Critics, op. cit., p. 38.
34. For more on this issue, see Kavolis, Civilization Analysis
Sociology of Culture, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
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